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The literature on noncompliant firms in transferable emissions permit systems offers little
guidance to policymakers that must determine how to commit resources to monitor firms and punish
violations in such systems. We consider how a budget-constrained enforcement autl1ority that seeks to
minimize aggregate noncompliance in a transferable emissions permit system should allocate its
monitoring and enforcement efforts among heterogeneous firms. With a conventional model of firm
behavior in a transferable permit system, we find that differences in the allocation of monitoring and
enforcement effort between any two types of firms should be independent of differences in their
exogenous characteristics. © 1999 Academic Press

1. INTRODUCTION
Transferable em1ss10ns permit systems are gaining support in policy circles in
large part because of their well-known efficiency properties, and because of the
belief that efficient outcomes can be achieved more easily than with command
and-control standards. However, the efficiency properties of transferable permit
system appear to hold only under quite stringent and patently unrealistic
assumptions. For example, a small but important literature has examined the effects
of noncompliance on the performance of transferable permit systems. Malik [9]
appears to be the first to cast doubt on the efficiency properties of transferable
permit systems when firms may be noncompliant. In a comparison of a transferable
permit system to uniform emissions standards with exogenous enforcement, Keeler
[8] finds that noncompliance (and hence, aggregate emissions) may be greater under
a transferable permit system than under uniform standards. In another comparison
of a transferable permit system to a uniform emissions standard, but this time when
enforcement expenditures are committed to achieve a certain degree of compliance,
Malik [10] finds that a transferable permit system may be
1Thanks are due Barry Field, Tom Stevens, two anonymous referees, and an associate editor of tl1e

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management for their insightful comments and suggestions.

more costly to enforce, and hence, enforcement plus aggregate abatement costs
may actually be higher for such systems than for uniform emissions standards.
Despite the importance of examining the welfare properties of transferable
permit systems and comparing them to alternative policies when firms may be
noncompliant, the literature offers little guidance to policymakers that are faced
with the problem of how to commit resources to monitor firms and punish
violations in transferable permit systems. It is toward providing some of this
guidance that this paper is directed. The primary objective of this paper is to
consider a fundamental policy question that has not been addressed before: How
should a budget-constrained enforcement authority distribute its effort among
heterogeneous, noncompliant firms in a transferable emissions permit system?
Garvie and Keeler [5] address this issue in the context of emissions standards,
and we follow their approach quite closely. In particular, we model both monitor
ing and enforcement effort, where monitoring is captured by the probability with
which a firm is audited and enforcement is a resource commitment to punish
violations once they are detected. In addition, we model the regulatory choice of
monitoring and enforcement as a two-stage game with complete information. In
the first stage of the game, a budget-constrained enforcement authority chooses a
monitoring and enforcement regime to minimize aggregate noncompliance in a
transferable emissions permit system. In the second stage the firms choose their
emissions, their demands for emissions permits, their consequent violations, and an
equilibrium in the permit market is established.
The paper is organized in the spirit of backward induction, so we begin in
Section 2 with an analysis of a firm's choices. The most important results of this
section are two independence results that have significant implications for effective
monitoring and enforcement. We show first that a firm's choice of emissions is
independent of the monitoring and enforcement pressure applied to it. This result
is not entirely new (Malik [9]), but its implications for monitoring and enforcement
policy have not been explored. The most surprising result of this section is new: a
firm's choice of violation, even whether it is to be in violation or not, is indepen
dent of its exogenous characteristics. This result suggests that if one observes that a
firm is in violation more often than another, it is likely due to differences in
monitoring and enforcement not because it employs an inferior emissions-control
technology or a dirtier production process.
In Section 3 we begin by characterizing equilibria of the emissions permit market
when firms are noncompliant. Taking the firm's choices and the resulting equilibria
into account, we examine the enforcement authority's optimizing distribution of
monitoring and enforcement pressure among the firms and find that differences in
the pressure applied to different types of firms should be independent of differ
ences in the firms' exogenous characteristics. Thus, an enforcement authority that
seeks to maximize the effectiveness of its enforcement budget should not concern
itself with fundamental differences among the firms to guide its decisions about
distributing monitoring and enforcement efforts, even though the firms may be
very different. This result stands in sharp contrast to Garvie and Keeler's finding
that optimal monitoring and enforcement of emissions standards requires that
greater monitoring and enforcement effort be directed at firms with parametrically
higher marginal control costs.
In Section 4 we discuss a number of policy implications of our finding that
differences in the application of monitoring and enforcement in a transferable

emissions permit system should be independent of differences in the firms' exoge
nous characteristics. We note first that the result depends critically on the two
independence results of Section 2-each firm's choice of emissions is independent
of the monitoring and enforcement pressure applied to it, and each firm's choice of
violation is independent of its exogenous characteristics. A judgement about the
real-world applicability of our primary policy conclusion must rest on empirical
tests of these hypotheses.
If empirically valid, our primary finding has strong implications about the value
and use of information on firms' abatement costs in the design of enforcement
strategies for transferable permit systems. Since the distribution of monitoring and
enforcement effort should be independent of exogenous differences among the
firms, if the firms face the same penalty structure and the costs of conducting
audits and applying enforcement pressure do not vary across firms, a uniform
monitoring and enforcement strategy that exhausts the enforcement budget mini
mizes aggregate noncompliance given that budget. Thus, in this case, knowledge of
the firms' abatement costs is not relevant for designing an enforcement strategy.
This strong conclusion needs to be qualified somewhat when penalty structures and
monitoring and enforcement cost-parameters vary across firms. In these cases, a
differentiated monitoring and enforcement strategy is required, and the distribu
tion of effort depends, in part, on the equilibrium permit price. Knowledge of the
firms' abatement costs is necessary to forecast the equilibrium permit price, but
once again, exogenous differences of the firms' abatement costs should not affect
the distribution of monitoring and enforcement effort.
2. FIRM BEHAVIOR IN A TRANSFERABLE EMISSIONS
PERMIT SYSTEM

2.1. Basic Assumptions
Throughout, we consider a fixed set of heterogeneous, risk-neutral firms. We
assume a competitive emissions permit market so that the choices of a single firm
have no effect on the equilibrium of the market. We wish to incorporate the fact
that an enforcement authority's strategy will likely affect the permit market
equilibrium, and this in turn will affect the firms' equilibrium compliance choices.
Toward that end, we assume that firms are grouped by type into a set K, and that
there are n k identical firms of type k. The enforcement authority is going to
choose a type-specific monitoring and enforcement strategy. We assume that there
are enough firms of each type so that their aggregate choices impact the market
equilibrium; hence, the enforcement authority must account for the market effects
of its monitoring and enforcement strategy. 2
The emissions-control (abatement) costs of a k-type firm are summarized by
c(e k , a k ), which is strictly decreasing and convex in the firm's emissions
e k [c e(e k , a k ) < 0 and c ee (e k, a k ) > O; throughout subscripts denote partial deriva2 Our assumption of identical firms of each type is not critical. A reasonable alternative would
assume that the firms are all different, but that there is at least one characteristic that is common to
groups of firms upon which the enforcement authority may condition its monitoring and enforcement
strategy (e.g., whether a particular control device is installed or not). All of the results of this paper hold
under this alternative specification.

tives in the usual manner]. Typically, a polluting firm may pursue a number of
strategies to control its emissions including reducing its output, substitution toward
cleaner inputs, adopting cleaner production techniques, as well as installing end
of-pipe emissions-control devices. Therefore, its emissions-control costs will de
pend on a number of exogenous factors including prices of outputs and inputs, and
parametric characteristics of its production and emissions-control technologies. 3
For a k-type firm, these characteristics are arrayed in the vector a k , and exogenous
Jinn-heterogeneity is introduced to the model by allowing this vector of parameters
to vary among types of firms. [In a slight abuse of notation, a derivative with
respect to some element of a k will usually be indicated simply by the subscript a;
for example, -c ecx (e k , a k ) will denote the change in marginal abatement costs
from a change in some element of a k .J
Suppose that a total of L emissions permits are issued to the firms free-of-charge,
and that possession of a permit confers the legal right to release one unit of
emissions. Let be the number of emissions permits that are initially allocated to
each k-type firm, and let f k be the number of permits each of these firms holds
after trade. Competitive behavior in the permit market establishes a constant
permit price p. If a k-type firm is noncompliant, its emissions exceed the number
of permits it holds and the magnitude of its violation is u k = e k - f k > 0. If a firm
is compliant, ek - f k � 0 and u k = 0.
We allow the probability with which a firm is audited (monitoring) and the
commitment to penalize noncompliance (enforcement) to vary among firm-types,
but not among firms of the same type. Suppose that each k-type firm is audited
with constant probability 1r k . We have in mind here that the enforcement authority
commits to auditing n k < n k firms of type k at random so that 1r k = n k /n k. If a
firm is found to be in violation, a penalty f(u k , <p k ) is imposed by a judiciary.
Following Garvie and Keeler [5J, <p k denotes a commitment of resources that
allows the authority to bring enforcement pressure to bear on a k-type firm if
necessary. Enforcement effort may include notification of a violation, bringing a
civil suit against a noncompliant firm, or even developing and prosecuting a
criminal case against executives of noncompliant firms. We restrict the analysis by
assuming throughout that <p k > 0 for each k. Given positive enforcement expendi
tures, the penalty for a zero violation is zero but the marginal penalty for a zero
violation is greater than zero [f(O, <p k ) = 0 and fu (O, <p k )> OJ. Assume that the
penalty is increasing at an increasing rate in the level of the violation [fu (u k , <p k )>
0 and fju k , cp k )> OJ, and that the penalty and the marginal penalty are both
increasing in the enforcement commitment [f/u k , <p k )> 0 and fu /u k , <p k )> O].
Although our characterization of the firm's expected compliance costs is quite
similar to those of Malik ([9, 10]) and Keeler [8J, there are some important
differences. None of these works explicitly distinguish between monitoring and
enforcement. Malik [9J allows for nonneutral attitudes toward risk and assumes
audit probabilities that depend on the firms' choices of emissions and permit-hold
ings, while we assume risk-neutral firms and, since audits of firms of a particular
type are random, our audit probabilities do not depend a priori on the firms'
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In addition, a firm's control costs may be affected by regulations that are not directly related to
emissions control. For example, a number of authors have noted that state public utility commission
regulations may have significant impacts on the behavior and control costs of firms that trade sulfur
dioxide allowances under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments ([2-4]).

choices. Keeler [8] assumes that firms are risk-neutral and that expected penalties
are constant for all firms, indicating implicitly that monitoring and enforcement
efforts are constant across firms. He also considers the implications of expected
penalties that are increasing but at constant, decreasing, and increasing rates in the
level of violation. Expected penalties in our model may vary across firm-types and
we choose to focus on the case in which they are increasing at an increasing rate in
a firm's violation. Malik [10] assumes risk-neutral firms, audit probabilities that
vary among firms, and a penalty function that is increasing and convex in the size
of a violation; hence, at least on these grounds, his model is most similar to ours. It
bears repeating though that we deal explicitly with the problem of designing a
monitoring and enforcement program for a transferable emissions permit system,
while these others do not. 4
2.2. A Firm's Choices of Emissions, Pennits, and Violation
At the time the firms make their choices, the enforcement authority has
committed itself to a type-specific monitoring and enforcement program. We
assume that each firm chooses positive emissions and permits, and never overcom
plies. Then, a k-type firm's problem is to choose emissions and permits to
min c(e k , a k ) + p(l k - zn + 1T k f(e k - l k , <p k ),
s.t. e k - [ k � 0.

( 1)

The Lagrange equation for (1) is () k = c(e k , a k ) + p(l k - zt) + 1r k f(e k - t k , <p k )
- r, k (e k - [ k ) and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
,1.,k) _ 'Y/ k = O·'
()ek = c e(e k ' a k ) + 1r kJ+v (e k _ z k ' 'fJ
ef = p - 1r k f (e k - z k , cp k ) + 'Y/ k = O;

(2b)

()71k = [ k - e k � 0,

(2c)

u

'Y/ k � 0,

'Y/ k

X

(l k - e k ) = 0.

(2a)

Given our assumptions about abatement costs and the penalty schedule, (2a)-(2c)
are necessary and sufficient to determine the firm's optimal choices of emissions
and permits uniquely.
Whether a k-type firm is compliant or not, it chooses its emissions so that the
price of a permit is equal to its marginal abatement cost; that is, its emissions-choice
rule is

(3)
4
Two other papers on monitoring and enforcement of transferable permit systems deserve mention.
The first paper in this literature appears to be Beavis and Walker [1]. They considered noncompliant
behavior when emissions are random (emissions in our model are deterministic) and they characterized
a uniform monitoring program to achieve an aggregate emissions target in a cost-effective manner.
vanEgteren and Weber [15] examined noncompliance when the aggregate issuance of permits and
monitoring are fixed and one firm exercises power in the permit market. Their primary result is that
when market power is present, the initial distribution of permits may be used as an implicit enforcement
mechanism. In our model, the permit market is competitive so that all choices are independent of the
initial distribution of permits.

To establish this result, simply combine (2a) and (2b) to obtain c/e k , a k ) + p = 0.
Note that, in equilibrium, the firms' marginal abatement costs are equal.
A simple inspection of (3) reveals:
RESULT 1. A k-type firm's choice of emissions is independent of the probability
that it will be audited n k and the enforcement pressure applied to it cp k .

This is consistent with an observation by Malik ([9, p. 101]), who noted that when
the probability with which a firm is audited is constant as in the case of random
audits, a firm's choice of emissions is independent of the probability that it will be
audited. [Harford [7] derives a similar conclusion in the case of an emissions tax].
Although not surprising, our result notes that this independence extends to
enforcement pressure as well. As Malik notes, and we repeat here, this does not
imply that the equilibrium distribution of emissions among the firms is indepen
dent of the choice of monitoring and enforcement policy. There will be an indirect
effect on equilibrium emissions of monitoring and enforcement because the choice
of a monitoring and enforcement strategy will affect the equilibrium permit price,
and this in turn will affect equilibrium choices of emissions.
Turn now to the firm's demand for emissions permits. When it is compliant the
number of permits it demands is simply equal to its choice of emissions; that is,
[ k (a k , p) = e k (a k , p). When the firm is noncompliant its demand for emissions
permits is

To obtain (4) note from (2b) and (2c) that e k - z k > 0 implies Y/ k = 0 and
ef = p - n kf/e k - [ k , cp k ) = 0. Substitution of the firm's choice of emissions
e k (a k , p) into p - n kf/e k - [ k , cp k ) = 0 yields (4). Note that although a noncom
pliant firm's choice of emissions is not directly affected by the monitoring and
enforcement effort applied to it, its demand for emissions permits is.
If all firms are noncompliant, (4) implies that each firm will equate its marginal
expected penalty to the permit price. Since each firm also equates its marginal
abatement cost to the permit price, marginal abatement costs and marginal
expected penalties are equal to each other and equal across firms. We see in
Section 3 that the equilibrating nature of emissions permit markets has an
important implication for the ability of an enforcement authority to exploit
fundamental differences among the firms.
Having specified a firm's choice of emissions and its demand for permits, we can
now turn to its choice of violation. We start with its choice of whether to be
compliant or not: A k-type firm is compliant if and only if

( 5)
Although this result is not new, one aspect of it has been overlooked; namely, (5)
does not depend on a k . A firm's decision to be compliant or not depends only on
5
Malik [10] and vanEgteren and Weber [15] assert that (5) is sufficient to guarantee compliance when
f,jv k , <p k ) :2: 0. When f,jv k , <p k ) > 0, (5) is also necessary. To show that e k - [ k = 0 only if (5) holds,
assume toward a contradiction that e k - z k = 0 while p - 1r kf,/O, <p k ) > 0. Then, since r, k :2: 0 by (2c),
p - 1r kf1 ,(0, <p k ) > 0 implies p - 1r kfJO, <p k ) + r, k > 0. But (2b) requires that if e k - [ k = 0 is an
optimal choice, p - 1r kf,,(O, <p k ) + r, k = O; hence, a contradiction.

the relationship between the permit price and the marginal expected penalty of a
vanishingly slight violation, not on parametric characteristics of its emissions-con
trol costs. In fact, this independence extends further.
RESULT 2. A k-type firm's choice of violation, including whether it is compliant or
not, is independent of its exogenous characteristics a k .

Proof of Result 2. The result that a firm's choice between a zero violation
(compliance) and a positive violation (noncompliance) is independent of a k is
immediately obvious from (5). Therefore, we need only consider the effect on the
firm's choice of a positive violation of a change in some element of a k . When the
firm is noncompliant, (2b) and (2c) require p - n kfu (e k - l k , cp k ) = 0. Taking
account of the firm's choice of emissions (3) and its choice of permits (4) we have

Differentiate this with respect to some element of a k to obtain - n kfu u X
(e! - l!) = 0, which implies u! = e! - l! = 0.
Q.E.D.
Result 2 is rather surprising because it reveals that, holding monitoring, enforce
ment and the permit price constant, a change in some parameter that affects the
abatement costs of a firm has no effect on its choice of violation. To illustrate,
suppose that a firm adopts a cleaner production process. This lowers its marginal
abatement costs (since -c e /e k, a k ) < 0) so it is motivated to reduce its emissions
(e! < 0) because it is now cheaper to do so. What is unexpected is that the firm is
also motivated to sell the corresponding number of permits U! = e!) so that its
level of violation remains unchanged. The intuition behind this result is as follows:
The marginal expected benefit to a firm of a marginal reduction in its violation is
the marginal expected penalty it avoids, which clearly does not depend on the
firm's characteristics. To reduce its violation it may purchase the legal right to
emit, the marginal cost of which is the equilibrium permit price, or it may reduce
its emissions, the marginal cost of which is -c/e k , a k ). But, the firm always
chooses its emissions to equate its marginal abatement costs to the price of an
emissions permit [see (3)]. Hence, the marginal cost of reducing its violation is
simply equal to the permit price, and hence, independent of the firm's characteris
tics. Since the marginal costs and benefits to a firm of reducing its violation are
both independent of its exogenous characteristics, so too is its choice of violation.
Result 2 suggests that a difference in the violations of any two types of firms is
independent of differences in their exogenous characteristics. Thus, if two firms are
audited with the same probability and the same enforcement effort is applied to
each, they both should have the same level of violation even though one may
employ a less advanced emissions-control technology or use a dirtier production
process. The policy significance of this is that if a regulatory authority is to consider
why some firms cheat more than others, the answer likely lies in differences in
monitoring and enforcement, not in the firms' fundamental differences. As with
Result 1. we note that Result 2 does not imply that equilibrium violations are
independent of the firms' exogenous characteristics. Again, there is an indirect
price effect. The firms' exogenous characteristics affect aggregate demand for
emissions permits, and hence, the equilibrium permit price, which in turn affects
equilibrium violations.

TABLE I
Comparative Statics of a Firm's Choices of Emissions, Permits, and Level of Violation
Emissions (e k )
-c rn (e k , a k )

Permits (l k )

Violation (u k )

et = zt

l\� = 0

ak

e "k =

7T k

e! = 0

z1Tk =

</> k

e� = 0

k
k
fv1,( u , </> )
>0
z,kp fvv( l) k ' </> k )

p

ePk =

c e ,(e k , a k )

-1

c e ,(e , a k )
k

<0

k
fr,( 1: k , </> )

7T kf,w( 1/, </> k )

1

>0

<0
zPk = ePk - k
1r ,,,,( v k , </> k )
f

u! = -l! <0
u,t = -l� <0
u; =

1

1r k ,,,,( v k , </> k )
f

>0

A noncompliant firm's choice of violation depends only on the monitoring and
enforcement effort applied to it and the emissions permit price. Thus, using (3) and
(4), we write the choice of violation of a noncompliant firm as
uk('TT'k, <Pk ,p) = ek(cxk,p) _ zk(cxk,'TT'k, <Pk ,p).
(6)
The marginal impacts of cxk, 'TT'k, cpk, and p on the choices of emissions, permits,
and violation of a noncompliant k-type firm are presented in Table I. 6 We have
already discussed the marginal impacts of a change in some element of ex k on a
k-type firm's choices. We have also noted that a firm's choice of emissions is
independent of the monitoring and enforcement effort applied to it (Result 1);
therefore, its choice of violation is affected by monitoring and enforcement only
through induced changes in the number of permits it chooses to hold. For example,
if a k-type firm faces a higher audit probability, then noncompliance is a relatively
less attractive strategy. Hence, it is motivated to reduce its violation (v! < 0) by
purchasing more permits U! > 0), not by reducing its emissions (e! = 0). The same
qualitative effects occur when the regulator has committed itself to greater
enforcement effort. A higher permit price implies that purchasing the legal right to
emit is a relatively less attractive option than reducing emissions, so a firm is
motivated to hold fewer permits and reduce its emissions (et < 0 and z:, < 0). In
addition, a higher permit price makes noncompliance a relatively more attractive
option so that a firm is motivated to increase its violation (u1� > 0).
3. DISTRIBUTING EFFORT AMONG NONCOMPLIANT FIRMS

In this section we endogenize the allocation of monitoring and enforcement
effort among the firms. Our regulatory-choice model is the same as that of Garvie
and Keeler [5], except their model is applied to the enforcement of emissions
standards. Following their approach we assume that the enforcement authority has
a fixed budget with which it chooses a type-specific monitoring and enforcement
program to minimize aggregate violations, and we simplify the analysis by assuming
that all firms are noncompliant.
6

To conserve space we have omitted the derivations of these comparative statics. They are available
upon request.
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ENFORCING TRANSFERABLE PERMITS

3.1. Permit Market Equilibrium When Firms Are Noncompliant

To choose an effective monitoring and enforcement program, the enforcement
authority must take into account how its policy affects the equilibrium in the
,
$ = ($k)k,K.
emissions permit market. Let a = ( a k k k E Kn-, = ( T " ) ~ , ~ and
Assume that a total of L permits have been issued to the firms and the enforcement authority has committed itself to a type-specific monitoring and enforcement
program [n-, $1. Then, the equilibrium permit price when all firms are noncompliant is p = jX a , r , 4, L ) , which from (4) must satisfy

(Summations throughout are taken over the entire set K ) . Differentiate (7) with
respect to r h and 4" and rearrange the results to obtain
dp/dn-"

=

-nhl$( a h ,n-',

p ) > 0;

(8a)

dp/dcPh

=

- n " l $ ( a " , n - ' I , $ h , p ) / z n k l i ( a kr, k 4°F)
,
> 0.

(8b)

p ) / Z n k l i (a k ,n-',

$Iz,

$k,

The signs of (8a)-(8b) follow from 1: > 0, 1: > 0, and 1; < 0 (refer to Table I).
Intuitively, increased monitoring of noncompliant firms of a particular type motivates them to purchase more emissions permits (1; > 0) to reduce the magnitude
of their violations (u: < 0). This increased demand for permits then puts upward
pressure on the equilibrium permit price. A similar effect occurs if the regulator
directs greater enforcement expenditures at h-type firms.
3.2. Endogenous Monitoring and Enforcement

Suppose that the enforcement authority has a budget B , with which it chooses a
type-specific monitoring and enforcement program to minimize aggregate noncompliance. Recall that the probability with which a k-type firm is audited is n-' =
Ek/nk,where E k is the number of random audits the regulator conducts on k-type
firms and nk is the number of these firms. Suppose that the cost of conducting an
audit of any firm is a constant w. Then, the cost of establishing the audit
probability r k for k-type firms is wEk= wnkEk/nk= wnkn-'. The authority backs
that allows it to bring
up its audit of a k-type firm with a commitment of
enforcement pressure to bear on the firm if necessary. Since the authority audits
nk k-type firms, the cost of establishing its enforcement commitment for all of
these firms is $ k E k = $knkEk/nk= $knkn-k.Bringing all the components together, the enforcement authority's budget constraint is
B 2 wzn'n-'

+ z$knkn-k.

(9)

Note that the per-firm marginal cost of establishing the audit probability r k for
k-type firms is w + $ k , which consists of the audit cost and the resource commitment to punish the violation of one of these firms. The per-firm marginal cost of
establishing the enforcement commitment $ k for k-type firms is simply n- '.

With its limited resources the enforcement authority seeks to minimize aggre
gate equilibrium violations
(10)
where v k ( 1rk ,cpk ,p) is defined by (6) and p = p(cx, 1r, <p, L) is defined by (7).
An optimal monitoring and enforcement program, which we denote as [ 1r*, <p *]
= [( 1r � \ e K,(</J� )k e K] minimizes (10) subject to (9), 1rk E [O,1] and <p k � 0,
'r:/k E K. 7 Like Garvie and Keeler, we simplify the analysis further by restricting
our attention to interior solutions that exhaust the enforcement budget. The
Lagrange equation associated with the enforcement authority's design problem is
then
A= '[,nk vk (1rk ,cpk ,p) +

A[ w '[,nk1rk + '[,nk1rkcp k - B].

At [1r*, <p *]. the following first-order conditions must hold
aA*/a 1r" =n"v;( 1r�.</Jtfi*)

+ '[,nk v;(1ri,cpi,p*)[ap*/a1r"] + A*n"(w + </J�) =0,
h EK;

(lla)

aA* / a</)" =n"v;( 1r�.</Jt p*)
k
+'[,n v;(1ri,cpi,p*)[ap*/acp"] +A*n"1r� =0,

h EK;

(llb)
(llc)

In (1la)-(11b), p* =p( ex,1r*, <p *, L) is the equilibrium permit price under
[1r*,cp*].
Given that the enforcement authority's budget is just exhausted, the rules for
distributing monitoring and enforcement among the firms are quite straightfor
ward.

RESULT 3.
satisfy

The optimal distribution of monitoring and enforcement [1r*, <p *] must
h
- )
v1rh ( 1T' *
' </J"*, p *
- *)
v1T TT'j*, <pj*'p
j(
v;( 1r�.</Jtfi*)

vj( TT'�, <p�, p*)

Proof Result 3.

w + <p�
w + <p�
TT'�
TT'�

'r:Jh,j EK;
'r:/h,j EK.

(12a)
(12b)

Substitute for ap*/a 1r" from (Ba) to rewrite (1la) as

v;( 1r�.</Jtfi*)-l!(a". 1rt</Jtfi*) XA*
w + <p �

(13)

7The enforcement authority's design problem may be very complex, particularly because its con
straint set is not convex. See Garvie and Keeler's Fig. 1 for an illustration of this nonconvexity.

where

To confirm the appropriate function arguments for z;. Z!, and v!, 't/k EK, see (4)
and (6). Now, for any two types of firms, say h and j, (13) implies
( 14 )
From Table I,
't/k EK.

(15)

Substitution of (15) into (14) yields (12a).
Now substitute for ap* / a¢" from (8b) to rewrite (11b) as
v;(7T L¢LP*)-t;(a", 7T L¢LP*) XA*

(16)

7Tt

For any two types of firms, h and j, (16) implies
v;(7T L¢LP*)-t;(a", 7T L¢LP*) XA*
j
vJ(7T L¢�.p*)-lHa , 7T L¢�.p*) XA*

(17)

From Table I.
't/k EK,

(18)

which upon substitution into (17) yields (12b).
Q.E.D.
The conditions given by (12a) are derived directly from (1 la); hence, they
provide necessary conditions for allocating monitoring effort between every pair of
firm types. They indicate that the ratio of the direct marginal impacts of monitor
ing on the violations of any two types of firms must equal the ratio of the per-firm
marginal costs of establishing the audit probabilities for these firms. By "direct
marginal impacts" we mean the marginal impacts of monitoring on the firms'
violations when the permit price is held constant at p *. Similarly, the conditions
given by (12b) are derived from (11b), and provide necessary conditions for
allocating enforcement resources between every pair of firms. They indicate that
the ratio of the direct marginal impacts of enforcement on the violations of any two
types of firms must equal the ratio of the per-firm marginal costs of establishing
the enforcement commitment for these firms.
Proposition 1 follows immediately from (12a)-(12b):
PROPOSITION 1. In an optimal monitoring and enforcement program, differences in
the monitoring and enforcement effort applied to any two types of firms are independent
of the differences in the exogenous characteristics of these firms.

t <pt

Proof of Proposition l. Since differences between v � = v h ( 7T
p *) and
and cxj (recall
vt = vj( 1rt </Jt p *) are independent of differences between
Result 2), the proposition follows from a simple inspection of (12a)-(12b). Q.E.D.

ex"

Proposition 1 is the primary result of our analysis and we discuss its policy
significance at some length. Before we do, however, let us note that the proposition
stems from the two independence results that we derived in Section 2. Clearly,
Proposition 1 requires Result 2-each firm's choice of violation must be indepen
dent of its exogenous characteristics. What is not so clear is that Proposition 1 also
requires Result 1-each firm's choice of emissions must be independent of the
monitoring and enforcement effort applied to it.
Contrary to Result 1. suppose instead that each firm's choice of emissions is not
independent of the monitoring and enforcement effort applied to it. Then we
would write a k-type firm's choice of emissions as ek (cxk , 1rk , cp k , p) instead of as
(3). Doing so does not affect the essential structure of the enforcement authority's
design problem, and it does not affect the first-order conditions (lla)-(llb). In
addition, the marginal impacts of monitoring and enforcement effort on the
equilibrium permit price (8a)-(8b) would remain the same. Therefore, Eqs. (14)
and (17) in the Proof of Result 3 would also remain the same. Note in the Proof of
Result 3 that (12a) is derived from (14) using (15), and (12b) is derived from (17)
using (18). Now, if each firm's choice of emissions depended on the monitoring and
enforcement effort applied to it, (15) and (18) would instead be
'r/k EK,
( 15')
and
'r/k EK.
(18')
Now, use (15') to substitute for t!(cx h , 1rt </Jtfi*) and l�(cx j, 1rt </Jtfi*) in
(14) and use (18') to substitute for z:(a h , 1rt </Jtfi*) and Zi(cxt 1rt </Jtfi*) in
(17) to obtain
v�(1r �.</Jtfi*) X [1 +A*]-e!(a", 1r �.¢tfi*) XA*
v!( 1r L</Jt,fi*) X [1 +A*]-e�(cx j , 1r L</Jt,fi*) XA*

<p�

w+
(14'
)
w + </Jt .

and
vj( 1r �.</Jtfi*) X [1 +A*]-e:(a". 1r �.¢tfi*) XA*
vJ(1rL¢LJi*) X [1 +A*]-eHcx j , 1r L¢�.p*) XA*

(17')

Equation (14') clearly indicates that differences in the optimal monitoring of h
and j-type firms would depend on differences between e!(a". 1rt </Jtfi*) and
p*), which in turn would depend on differences in the parametric
et(cx j, 1r �,
characteristics of h- and j-type firms, a" and cxf. In a similar fashion, Eq. (17')
indicates that differences in the optimal enforcement effort directed at h- and

<p�,

j-type firms would also depend on differences in the exogenous characteristics of h
and j-type firms. Thus, Proposition 1 would not hold if, contrary to Result 1, each
firm's choice of emissions depended on the monitoring and enforcement pressure
applied to it.
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Proposition 1 has a very strong policy implication: in a transferable permit
system, an enforcement authority is not to use parametric differences among
regulated firms to guide its decisions about distributing monitoring and enforce
ment efforts among them. We have shown that this conclusion depends critically
on two independence results concerning firms' choices of emissions and violations:
(1) each firm's choice of emissions is independent of the monitoring and enforce
ment effort applied to it, and (2) each firm's choice of violation is independent of
its exogenous characteristics. With appropriate data on emissions, violations, firm
characteristics, and key enforcement parameters, these hypotheses can be sub
jected to rigorous econometric tests. However, we doubt that these tests can be
conducted at the present time. The primary problem is that the current generation
of market-based initiatives have been in existence for only a short time, and thus
far have achieved perfect, or very close to perfect, compliance rates. 8 There is
simply not enough variation in compliance rates as yet to conduct adequate tests of
these independence results.
Conducting these tests in an experimental setting is a viable second best option.
Experimental tests of other aspects of the design of transferable permit systems
have been conducted (for an example, see [6]), but none have focused on the design
of enforcement strategies. In fact, we are not aware of any experimental analyses
of enforcement strategies for environmental policies. In the absence of the appro
priate data for econometric analysis, tests of our fundamental independence results
in an experimental setting seems to us to be a natural way to obtain initial
information about the empirical validity of out primary policy recommendation.
If empirically valid, Proposition 1 implies that there is no point to applying more
intense monitoring and enforcement efforts to firms that employ less advanced
emissions-control technologies, or that use dirtier production processes, or that
differ in any other fundamental way. The inability of an enforcement authority to
exploit exogenous differences among regulated firms to target its monitoring and
enforcement effort is due to the equilibrating nature of the permit market. Recall
from Section 2 that each firm chooses its emissions so that its marginal abatement
cost is equal to the permit price, and it chooses the number of permits to hold so
that its marginal expected penalty is also equal to the permit price. Since all firms
face the same permit price, marginal abatement costs and marginal expected
penalties are equal to each other and equal across firms. This will be true for any
strategy the enforcement authority may choose (at least all those strategies that
induce interior outcomes). Therefore, exogenous differences in abatement costs
8Since its inception, firms in the Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Trading program have been perfectly
compliant ([12-14]). There have been a small number of violations in the Regional Economic Incentives
Market program (RECLAIM) of the Los Angeles air basin, but program authorities do not attribute
these violations to deliberate attempts by firms to evade their legal obligations. Rather, they seem to be
the result of a few firms that lacked sufficient understanding of the required protocols [11].

cannot be exploited to enhance the productivity of a fixed enforcement budget
because, in a permit market equilibrium, all marginal abatement costs are equal
regardless of the enforcement authority's strategy.9
The inability of an enforcement authority to exploit exogenous differences
among firms has important implications for the value of firm-level information in
the design of a monitoring and enforcement strategy. Recall that if uniform
monitoring and enforcement is applied to the firms in our model, their violations
will be the same. Therefore, it is clear that a uniform monitoring and enforcement
strategy will satisfy (12a)-(12b), and if it just exhausts the enforcement budget it
will be an optimal program. Furthermore, a uniform monitoring and enforcement
strategy suggests that knowledge of the firms' abatement costs is not relevant in the
design of the monitoring and enforcement strategy. Thus, the asymmetric informa
tion problem of firms having better information about their control costs than
regulatory authorities may have no bearing on an enforcement authority's choice of
strategy in a transferable permit system.
However, it is clear that the recommendation of uniform monitoring and
enforcement depends on the uniformity of key monitoring and enforcement
parameters. If the costs of conducting audits and applying enforcement effort vary
across firms, or if there are parametric differences in the penalty function that are
due, for example, to regional differences in the severity of penalties imposed by
courts, a uniform monitoring and enforcement strategy will not be appropriate.
When a differentiated strategy is called for because of differences in monitoring
and enforcement parameters, knowledge of the firms' exogenous characteristics
becomes useful because these characteristics affect the optimal monitoring and
enforcement program through their impacts on the equilibrium permit price. This
is seen clearly in (12a)-(12b) where the firms' characteristics show up in the
specification of the equilibrium permit price. In fact, determining a strategy when
uniformity is not optimal requires the enforcement authority to forecast equilib
rium violations. This requires a forecast of the equilibrium permit price and this
requires information about the firms' exogenous characteristics.
To conclude this section, let us contrast Proposition 1 to an analogous result of
Garvie and Keeler [5]. With the same regulatory-choice model but applied to firms
that face emissions standards, they found that greater monitoring and enforcement
effort should be directed at firms with parametrically higher marginal abatement
costs. We, of course, have shown that when firms operate under a transferable
emissions permit system, the distribution of optimal monitoring and enforcement is
independent of exogenous differences in their abatement costs. From the asymmet
ric information perspective, given that audit and enforcement costs and penalty
structures do not vary across firms, knowledge of firms' abatement costs is useful
information in designing a compliance-maximizing enforcement strategy for emis9This issue is complicated somewhat by the fact that the enforcement authority's strategy impacts the
equilibrium permit price. If monitoring and enforcement of different types of firms have differential
impacts on the permit price, the enforcement authority may be able to manipulate the permit price to
attain higher compliance rates. Of course, Proposition 1 suggests that it cannot. More directly, it can be
shown tliat the differential marginal impacts of monitoring of any two types of firms (i.e., ap / a1r h iJp / iJ1r i , "ii h ,t= j) are independent of exogenous differences of the firms. The same is true of the
differential marginal impacts of enforcement pressure. Thus, even from the perspective of manipulating
the equilibrium permit price to make its resources more productive, the enforcement authority is unable
to exploit fundamental differences among tl1e firms to do so.

sions standards, but this information is not relevant in the context of transferable
permits. The reasons for the difference between Garvie and Keeler's result and our
Proposition 1 are nearly immediate. When a firm faces an emissions standard, its
choice of emissions is not independent of the monitoring and enforcement effort
applied to it and its choice of violation is not independent of its exogenous
characteristics; that is, our Results 1 and 2 do not apply when firms face emissions
standards.
5. CONCLUSION

Market-based approaches to environmental policy have gained many adherents.
Theoretical and empirical work has indicated that environmental quality standards
can be achieved at much lower cost with a market-based approach than with
traditional command-and-control regulations, primarily because the former pro
vides sources of pollution more flexibility in choosing the manner in which they will
control their emissions. However a critical component of such policies has not been
adequately addressed; namely, how should compliance to such policies be en
forced? Without enforcement strategies that are designed to achieve acceptable
levels of compliance in a cost-effective manner, the efficiency-gains that can be
achieved by market-based systems may not materialize.
With a conventional model of noncompliant firms in a transferable emissions
permit system, we have addressed a fundamental policy question about monitoring
and enforcement of these systems: How should a budget-constrained enforcement
authority distribute monitoring and enforcement resources among heterogeneous
noncompliant firms? And we have obtained a surprising answer: the optimal
distribution of monitoring and enforcement is based on straightforward rules that
indicate that differences in the application of these efforts among heterogeneous
firms should be independent of differences in the firms' exogenous characteristics.
Thus, the justification for applying different monitoring and enforcement pressure
to different firms must come from differences in key enforcement parameters, not
from fundamental differences of the firms.
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